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CS4261 Algorithmic Mechanism Design
  • Nash Equilibria
  • Auctions and Routing Games
  • Cooperative Games
  • Axiomatic Approach to Fairness
  • Stable Matchings
  • Nash Bargaining Solution
  • Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
  • Cake Cutting
  • Rent Division
  • Committee Voting
  • Tournaments
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On this page
  • Setting
  • Terminology
  • Tournament Solutions
  • Examples
  • Top Cycle
  • Uncovered Set
  • Containment Relations
  • Others

Tournaments

Setting

This is the last setting we’re going to look at.

A tournament TTT can be represented formally by a set of alternatives AAA, and a pairwise dominance relation ≻\succ≻ between any two alternatives. That is, T=(A,≻)T = (A, \succ)T=(A,≻).

Here, a≻ba \succ ba≻b means that alternative aaa dominates alternative bbb.

And for every pair of alternatives, exactly one dominates the other. So, the “tournament graph” (A,≻)(A, \succ)(A,≻) is has (n2)\binom n 2(2n​) directed edges (it’s a complete graph). This is the most common way to represent a tournament.

Examples of use-cases include sports (where some teams beat others), elections (where we can form a majority graph, given a ranking of candidates by all voters), webpage ranking, biological interactions (for exampe, the pecking order in a flock of chickens).

Terminology

Outdegree of x∈Ax \in Ax∈A is the number of alternatives dominated by xxx (it’s called outdegree because it’s the number of outgoing edges from xxx in the tournament graph).

Outdegree is a reasonable measure of how strong an alternative is in some situations.

Note that in any tournament graph, the outdegree + indegree = n−1n-1n−1, where nnn is the number of alternatives.

Condorcet Winner: An alternative that dominates all other alternatives (i.e., outdegree = n−1n-1n−1)

Condorcet Loser: An alternatiev that is dominated by all other alternatives (i.e., outdegree = 0)

Tournament Solutions

A tournament solution is a method of choosing the “winners” (in fact, this mechanism is what defines who “wins”) of any tournament. Formally, it is a mapping from any tournament instance to a non-empty subset of alternatives.

A reasonable requirement of any tournament solution is to be invariant under isomorphisms. That is, relabelling the alternatives (but preserving the structure of the tournament graph) should yield the same winners. Basically, the algorithm should not use labels of the alternatives (e.g. names of sports teams) to determine who wins. An example is that the algorithm should not tie-break by alphabetical ordering of the alternatives.

Formally, if h:A→A′h: A \to A'h:A→A′ is an isomorphism between 2 tournaments, then the subset of that a tournament solution SSS chooses from T′T'T′ is the image (with respect to hhh) of the subset that SSS chooses from TTT.

As a direct consequence of this, in a cyclic tournament of size 3, every tournament solution must select ALL alternatives.

2 other common-sense axioms that we want our tournament solutions to satisfy are:

  1. Condorcet Consistency: If there is a Condorcet winnner xxx, then xxx is uniquely chosen.

  2. Monotonicity: If xxx is chosen, then it should remain chosen when it is strengthened against another alternative yyy and everything else remains the same. (i.e., improving a candidate’s strength cannot convert it from a winner to a loser.)

Examples

Examples of possible tournament solutions:

  1. Copeland set (CO): Alternatives with the highest outdegree.

  2. Top cycle (TC): Alternatives that can reach every other alternative via a directed path (of any length)

  3. Uncovered set (UC): Alternatives that can reach every other alternative via a directed path of length ≤2\leq 2≤2

  4. Banks set (BA): Alternatives that appear as the maximal (i.e., strongest) element of some transitive subtournamnet that cannot be extended. (A transitive tournament is one in which the alternatives can be ordered as a1,⋯ ,aka_1, \cdots, a_ka1​,⋯,ak​ so that aia_iai​ dominates aja_jaj​ for all i<ji < ji<j.)

Top Cycle

An equivalent definition of Top cycle is that it is the unique smallest nonempty set BBB of alternatives such that all alternatives in BBB dominate all alternatives outside BBB.

First, we need to show that such a set BBB is a well-defined / valid tournament solution. Clearly the set of all the alternatives satisfies the property that “all alternatives in BBB dominate all alternatives outside BBB” trivially — so we can always return some valid solution.

Next, we that the smallest such set BBB must be unique. Suppose not. Say, there were 2 smallest sets CCC and DDD such that both satisfy “all alternatives inside the set dominate all alternatives outside it”. This is clearly not possible: it is impossible to find x∈Cx \in Cx∈C and y∈Dy \in Dy∈D such that x∉Dx \notin Dx∈/D and y∉Cy \notin Cy∈/C. If we did, then by definition, we would need an arrow from x→yx \to yx→y as well as from y→xy \to xy→x (but both cannot dominate each other). (And one can’t be a strict subset of the other because of our requirement for “smallest” such set.)

So, we’ve shown that there is such a unique smallest nonempty set BBB.

Finally, we need to show that this definition of BBB is equivalent to our original definition.

Observe that any p∉Bp \notin Bp∈/B cannot reach any q∈Bq \in Bq∈B (because everything in BBB dominates everything outside BBB, so all the edges from BBB are outwards), hence ppp is not in TC.

Further, any q∈Bq \in Bq∈B can reach any p∉Bp \notin Bp∈/B directly.

So, all we have to show is that any q∈Bq \in Bq∈B can also reach any other r∈Br \in Br∈B (because for qqq to be in TC, it needs to be able to reach all other alternatives). This is where we can make use of the “smallest” criteria in the definition of BBB. Suppose not. Then, qqq cannot reach rrr. Find all the alternatives in BBB that can reach rrr (including rrr itself) — and we claim that this is a smaller set such that every alternative inside it dominates every alternative outside it (it’s smaller because it does not include qqq and it is a subset of BBB). It’s a valid such set because if any other alternative outside this set could dominate anything inside it, then it would be able to reach rrr via a path (of any length), and would’ve already been inside this set in the first place.

Hence, we’ve proved that the two definitions are equivalent.

Uncovered Set

Covering relation: An alternative xxx covers another alternative yyy iff:

  • xxx dominates yyy, and

  • For any zzz, if yyy dominates zzz, then xxx also dominates zzz.

It’s a very strong indicator that xxx is better than yyy → literally “i beat you, and i also beat everyone you beat.”

We claim that an equivlent definition of UC is the set of all uncovered alternatives (which is where the name comes from)

Suppose xxx can reach any yyy in at most 2 steps. Then, either xxx dominates yyy (path length = 1) or xxx dominates some zzz that dominates yyy (path length = 2). In either case, yyy cannot cover xxx. Similarly, we can show the other direction. So, xxx can reach yyy in 2 steps   ⟺  \iff⟺ yyy does not cover xxx.

Containment Relations

We prove some of them:

  1. UC ⊆\subseteq⊆ TC: trivial.

  2. CO ⊆\subseteq⊆ UC: Let x∈x \inx∈ CO. Then, xxx has the highest outdegree among all alternatives. Suppose for contradiction that yyy covers xxx. Then, yyy must dominate xxx as well as everyone that xxx dominates. Clealry, yyy must have outdegree strictly more than xxx. Contradiction.

  3. BA ⊆\subseteq⊆ UC: Let x∈x \inx∈ BA. Then, there is a transitive tournament T′T'T′ with xxx as the maximal element (head) that cannot be extended. Suppose for contradiction that yyy covers xxx. Then, yyy can extend T′T'T′ since it beats xxx and beats everyone that xxx beats. Contradiction.

Others

There are some other tournament solutoins (which goes to show that people try to come up with novel and fancy methods of solving this problem):

  1. Slater set (SL): Alternatives that are maximal elements in some transitive tournament that can be obtained by inverting as few edges as possible.

  2. Bipartisan set (BP): Alternatives that are chosen with nonzero probability in the (unique!) Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game formed by the tournment matrix.

  3. Markov set (MC): Alternatives that stay most often in the “winner stays” competition corresponding to the tournament (i.e., the limiting distribution of the markov chain modeled by the tournament where the randomness lies in selecting the next candidate to play against the current winner, not in who beats whom.)

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Last updated 6 months ago